Paal S. Hilde (IFS):
The Strategic Concept and the NCS: Shifting Gears? in J. Ringsmose and Sten Rynning (eds.), NATO's New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment, DIIS report 02, 2011.
Olav Schram Stokke (FNI):
"Interplay Management, Niche Selection, and Arctic Environmental Governance" in S. Oberthür and O. S. Stokke (eds.), Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2011.
Katarzyna Zysk (IFS):
The evolving Arctic Security Environment: An Assessment, in Stephen J Blank (ed.), Russia in the Arctic, Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College (SSI), Carlisle, United States 2011.
Abstract: In this chapter the state of the Arctic security environment is analyzed, with focus on economic, jurisdictional, political, and security processes in the region. Particular attention is devoted to the role of the Russian Federation, as the country that holds the key to political development in the Arctic in the decades to come.
Katarzyna Zysk (IFS):
Contributed as a as a subject matter expert to the Fleet Arctic Operations Game, sponsored by the Norfolk, VA-based U.S. Fleet Forces Command, the US Naval War College, Newport RI, September 13-16, 2011.
James Kraska (ed.):
Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change
Abstract: The book examines Arctic defense policy and military security from the perspective of all eight Arctic states. In light of climate change and melting ice in the Arctic Ocean, Canada, Russia, Denmark (Greenland), Norway and the United States, as well as Iceland, Sweden and Finland, are grappling with an emerging Arctic security paradigm. This volume brings together the world's most seasoned Arctic political-military experts from Europe and North America to analyze how Arctic nations are adapting their security postures to accommodate increased shipping, expanding naval presence, and energy and mineral development in the polar region. The book analyzes the ascent of Russia as the first 'Arctic superpower', the growing importance of polar security for NATO and the Nordic states, and the increasing role of Canada and the United States in the region.
Contributors: Franklyn Griffiths, Lawson Brigham, Joshua Ho, Rolf Tamnes, Geir Flikke, Katarzyna Zysk, Caitlyn Antrim, Pauli Järvenpää, Tomas Ries, Nikolaj Petersen, Adam Worm, Valur Ingimundarson, Robert Huebert, Whitney Lackenbauer, James Kraska, David W. Titley, Courtney St John.
Katarzyna Zysk (IFS):
Military aspects of Russia's Arctic policy: hard power and natural resources, in Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, ed. James Kraska, Cambridge University Press 2011, 85-106.
Abstract: Russian military activity in the Arctic has tangibly increased in recent years, adding perhaps the most controversial topic in debates on the region's future security. Combined with political assertiveness and rhetorical hostility toward the West, which was a particular feature of Vladimir Putin's second presidential term (2004–2008), the intensified presence of the Russian naval and air forces operating in the region has drawn much of the international attention and contributed to the image of Russia as the wild card in the Arctic strategic equation. This paper addresses military aspects of Russia’s Arctic policies, with a special attention devoted to identifying several different layers of the Russian military activity that is encompassing the Arctic region. First, it analyses the role and uses of the military in Russian foreign policy strategy and explains factors that contributed to the image of Russia as the wild card in the Arctic strategic equation. The discussion is followed by a study of relationships between the region’s commercial potential and Russia’s ambitious economic developments plans on the one hand, and military mission requirements for the various Russian security structures in the region on the other. Subsequently, this paper addresses the impact of the opening Arctic Ocean on the evolution of the Russian symmetrical threat perceptions and the country’s responses to the emerging non-traditional security challenges and threats. In conclusion, it draws implications of Russia’s policies in the changing Arctic environment for the circumpolar security dynamics.
Rolf Tamnes (IFS):
Arctic security and Norway, in Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change, ed. James Kraska, Cambridge University Press 2011.
Abstract: While Norway has been heavily engaged on a broad scale in the north for a very long time, both economically and militarily, since 2005 the Arctic has been accorded high priority in Norwegian policy. The government has launched a number of development projects that include establishing an international centre for climate and environmental research in Northern Norway, developing an integrated monitoring and notification system, commissioning a new ice-class research vessel, and improving maritime safety, emergency systems and oil spill response. In addition, high priority has been given to maintaining a military presence in the north. A major portion of the Armed Forces’ material investments is allocated to platforms and weapons that operate first and foremost in the maritime domain and in the north.
The priority of the north reflects a strong-felt need both for coping with the many challenges and for benefiting from the many new opportunities in the region. Norwegian authorities emphasises clear and unequivocal manifestations of Norwegian sovereignty and sovereign rights. Moreover, while engaging Russia has a key priority in Norwegian foreign and security policy, a central dictum in Norwegian policy is to handle vital issues within multilateral frameworks and in close conjunction with western countries and institutions. Thus Norway highlights the importance of Article 5 and the need for more tangible NATO footprints “in area”.
Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut (CSIS):
Common security in the Arctic: what strategic role for NATO? (notional title), CSIS,forthcoming.
Abstract: The Arctic presents a rare opportunity for international security cooperation yet competing national economic and political interests in the Arctic may present future challenges to the construction of a21st century security architecture for the Arctic. One of the foundational pillars of this security architecture must be NATO. Because NATO’s Article 5 commitment extends to the Arctic Circle and four out of the five Arctic coastal states are members of NATO, NATO is, and will continue to be, present in the Arctic. However, the time has now come to better define the Alliance’s future role and responsibilities in this dramatically transforming region, understanding that while it is unlikely that NATO will serve as the primary vehicle for ensuring Arctic security, it does have a role to play in enhancing maritime security, supporting search and rescue as well as humanitarian operations and facilitating scientific and climate adaption research.
Although some will argue that Russian opposition will prevent the development of a greater role for NATO in the Arctic, NATO and Russia in fact have shared experiences in search and rescue and disaster management, such as counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa, which can be expanded to the Arctic region. Other shared examples of Arctic cooperation are the U.S.-Russia joint task force on Search and Rescue through the Arctic Council and the joint-traffic control systems operated through the NATO-Russia Council’s Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI). Moreover, in 2010 the landmark and historic maritime border demarcation treaty between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea provide an excellent model for future cooperation.
Building upon the success of the November 2010 NATO-Russia Summit, dialogue, diplomacy, and transparency will be key drivers in improving both NATO-Russia relations in general and in utilizing this vehicle for greater collaboration and cooperation on Arctic security. It is recommended that through the NATO – Russia Council, Arctic issues related to scientific and environmental cooperation, maritime disaster response, crisis management exercises, and the coordination of Arctic littoral coast guard activities should be jointly explored. NATO Partnership for Peace and Arctic Council members Sweden and Finland should also be engaged in discussions regarding Arctic security and could contribute to joint-training exercises to improve interoperability, coordinate contingency planning, and share hydrographic and scientific data. Finally, as a significant portion of critical Arctic infrastructure and capabilities are owned by the private sector, NATO should discuss ways to engage the private sector and identify ways to contribute resources and capabilities when required. Finally, it is not inconceivable that NATO, like the EU, could seek observer status within the Arctic Council.